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Dernière mise à jour : Mai 2018

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Economie Publique

UMR Economie Publique


Alessandro Tavoni, May 11th 2021

Tuesday, May 11th 2021

Alessandro Tavoni (University of Bologna) will present his paper "Representation, Peer Pressure, and Punishment in a Public Goods Game Experiment" (joint with Hyoyoung Kim, Doruk İriş and Jinkwon Lee).



Examples of public goods dilemmas abound: environmental protection, international security, pandemic diseases and team production, to name a few. In such contexts decisions are usually delegated to a representative. Group members typically express their preferences to the representatives with varying degrees of formality, ranging from signaling (dis-)approval about a colleague’s decision to formal voting on referendum topics. Our experiment is designed to study public good provision choices in such situations of hierarchical decision-making, i.e. when decisions are taken at different levels: at a lower level the constituency elects a representative, while at a higher level elected representatives decide on the provision level. Specifically, using an otherwise standard repeated linear public goods game, we investigate how delegation and punishment affect provision. Our treatments are designed to shed light on the following questions:

  • Does representative behavior differ from that of self-representing individuals in terms of contributions to the public good and punishment of others?
  • What is the impact of non-binding peer pressure (in the form of payoff-immaterial messages from the constituency to their representative) on the representatives’ public good contributions and punishment decisions?”